Expedition upon Expedition: Former President Trump Seeks Supreme Court Intervention to Reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s Intervention in Special Master Proceedings; Department of Justice Seeks to Speed Up Appellate Review

Trump v. United States. No. 22-13005 (11th Cir.); Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294 (S.D. Fla.). Application to Vacate the Eleventh Circuit’s Stay of an Order Issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Petition to the Associate Supreme Court Justice of the United States for the Eleventh Circuit submitted October 4, 2022.


Former President Trump seeks the aid of the United States Supreme Court in vacating an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit which stayed a lower court’s order.  The lower court’s order precluded the use of documents with classification markings in  a criminal investigation while the documents were under review by a Special Master appointed by the court.  The Eleventh Circuit’s order countermanded that determination which in turn permitted resumption of use of the documents in criminal investigations.

The former president argues that the Eleventh Circuit had no power to rule on the Department of Justice’s request, as the ruling was an interlocutory, or non-final ruling.  Such rulings are not permitted except in limited circumstances.

At the same time, the Department of Justice seeks to press ahead in its request for appellate review of the federal district court’s actions.

 

Application to Vacate Eleventh Circuit Order October 4, 2022

Opposition to Appellant’s Motion to Expedite Appeal October 3, 2022

Motion to Expedite Appeal September 30, 2022

Carry On, Criminal Investigators! Eleventh Circuit Stays District Court Order Prohibiting Use of Classified Documents Seized from Former President’s Residence Pending Special Master Review


Donald J. Trump v. United States of America, No. 22-13005 (11th Cir.) Order issued  September 22, 2022 (Not For Publication).


In recent weeks, on application by former President Donald J. Trump, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued an order appointing a Special Master to assist in reviewing materials seized during an August search of the former president’s residence at Mar-a-Lago.  Pending completion of the Special Master’s review, the court ordered federal investigative officials to refrain from using any of the seized materials bearing classification markings, but specifically noted that classification review could continue.  The trial court denied the United States’ motion to stay that portion of the order that would preclude use of documents with classified markings in any ongoing criminal investigation and that would require submitting the documents with classification marking for review by the Special Master.  

The United States sought interlocutory review in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the trial court’s order according to principles governing issuance of injunctions, and found that the trial court, which has broad, yet not unbounded discretionary to such relief, erred in granting relief in the absence of evidence of callous disregard for the former president’s interest and in the presence of potential for serious harm to the government’s and the public’s interest if investigation is foreclosed.  The Eleventh Circuit has stayed the preclusion and turnover portions of the trial court’s order.

Trump v. U.S. No. 22-13005 (11th Cir.) Order of September 21, 202

Fifth Circuit Concludes the First Amendment Protects Speech, Not Censorship, Finding No Infirmity in Texas Law Promoting Fair Access to Internet Platforms


Net Choice, LLC, et al., v. Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, No. 21-51178 (5th Cir.) September 16, 2022.


Plaintiffs are internet technology platforms which have objected to recently-enacted Texas legislation intended to preclude viewpoint censorship.  Plaintiffs argue that the bill on its face violates the platforms’ First Amendment rights.

A three judge panel of the Fifth Circuit  has published its perceptionthat Net Choice and other plaintiffs have an inverted view of the First Amendment, which assures persons of the right to freedom of speech but which does not incorporate a corollary, but unenumerated, right to restrain speech.  In its September 16, 2022 opinion, the panel stated:

Today we reject the idea that corporations have a freewheeling First Amendment right to censor what people say.

Slip op. at 2.

The panel dismissed the notion that, as the platforms would have it, providers could terminate the accounts of anyone, particularly anyone articulating a disfavored view.

A platform might achieve market dominance by promising free speech, yet once ensconced as “the monopolist of ‘the modern public square’,” the platform might about face to cancel and ban anyone the platform’s employees might choose to disfavor.  Slip Op. at 2, citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).

The Texas bill in question precludes large media platforms from engaging in viewpoint discrimination with respect to access, excepting non-protected speech and speech specifically restricted by federal law, such as speech harmful to minors or other protective measures. Slip op. at 4.  Those who are restricted and believe this to be wrongful may seek relief in courts.  The state also might enforce the statute.

In addition, platforms must publish their moderation and use policies to the state concerning their moderation activities and actions, and mandates a complaint and appeal process for the platform’s users.

The Fifth Circuit panel noted that pre-enforcement facial challenges to to new laws, particularly any law concerning speech, are disfavored. Not only are courts constrained to decide only cases and controverses, but also federalism and comity concerns arise when federal courts review state laws before states have had the opportunity to do so.   To this must be added the extraordinarily high standard that attaches to facial challenges:  the challenging party must show that under no circumstances could the law in question be valid.

Here the challenge is one of overbreadth, a judicial doctrine intended to avoid chilling speech or association.

In this case the concern is not one of chilling speech, but of chilling censorship.  Censorship is inconsistent with the ‘pure speech’ that the overbreadth doctrine addresses.  Censorship is, at most, expressive conduct, to which only the most attenuated protections might attach.

No case directly supporting facial application of the overbreadth doctrine to censorship has been found, the court observed, and the as-applied challenges the platforms cite were presented when there were concrete challenged applications, unsuitable for use as a mechanism for invalidating a statute not yet operative.

Overbreadth challenges are intended to protect strangers to the litigation who could not lodge as-applied cases and whose speech would be chilled by an overly broad law.

The Fifth Circuit squarely rejects the notion that the Texas legislation inhibits speech by inhibiting platforms’ removal of speech, denouncing as inapt the platforms’ attempts to recast their censorship as protected speech.

The court also has declined to locate within the platforms’ notions of ‘editorial discretion’ any specifically protected speech interest.  Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 hinders rather than advances the platforms” arguments.

The panel did not favor the planforms’ strained construction of censorship as speech to be protected, while nonetheless insisting no speech is involved in invoking the protections of Section 230.

Even if editorial discretion could be seen as a protected legal category, advanced content arrangement and censorship could not meet qualification as a protected category.  No such category of individual discretion has been recognized.  As the Texas stattue neither forces the platforms to speak or interferes with their speech, the Texas legislation is not constitutionally defective.

While standing alone the Texas statute is constitutionally sound, Section 230 removes all doubt, for it specifically states that platforms are not publishers or speakers when they host others’ content.

The appellate panel has concluded that Texas was correct in characterizing the social media platforms as “common carriers’ subject to nondiscrimination regulations.”  Slip op. at 53.

The court rejected the platforms’ assertion that the platforms are not part of the communications industry, for their own representations confirm that communications is their purpose.  The platforms hold themselves out to the public as ‘traditional’ common carriers do, ostensibly serving all on the same terms.  Slip op. at 54.

The court also rejected the idea that platforms might elide that common carrier obligations by  promulgating their own internal regulations for use.  This is immaterial, in that the same terms apply to all.

The circularity of the platforms’ argument that they are not common carriers because they engage in viewpoint discrimination, a position offered in order to avoid common carrier regulation is “upside down,” much as is the argument that they cannot be common carriers because they remove some obscene speech, as the law permits this, much as transit carriers would be permitted to oust ill behaved riders.  To put a fine point on it:

The Platforms offer no reason to adopt an ahistorical approach under which a firm’s existing desire to discriminate against its customers somehow gives it a permanent immunity from common carrier nondiscrimination obligations.

Slip op. at 55.

Moreover, at this time it is difficult to avoid recognizing that the public interest in a wide swath of  topic’s underlies and informs much, if not most, use of social media and other internet platforms.

Several federal courts of appeal have recognized platforms as public forums.  Slip op. at 56. Where such platforms serve as central locations for public debate, exclusion from the forums is exclusion from public debate.  Slip op. at 56.  Additionally, the platforms are central operators in economic life, generating wealth through advertising and access.  Platforms may become entrenched in a particular area that cannot be reproduced by competitors, and thus is irreplaceable to users.

Government licensing is not necessary to establish common carrier monopoly, but if it were, Section 230 would suffice.

The platforms’ arguments about state nondiscrimination rules applicable to common carriers overlook that challenges to such laws were successful only where the laws did not further anti-discrimination but supported discrimination.  Other cases from the Lochner era have been long ago been discredited and cannot be revived now.

The platforms’ similarity to common carriers only undermines their assertion that their speech rights are involved.  Common carriers transport the speech of others, but this does not involved any speech rights of the carriers.

Even if the platforms’ speech interests were implicated, facial pre-enforcement relief could not be granted where the content and viewpoint neutral legislation would survive intermediate scrutiny.

The platforms’ complaints about what they assert are burdensome disclosure and reporting requirements do not merit pre-enforcement relief, and the platforms do not point to any impingement on any First Amendment rights that would arise during compliance.  Moreover, any additional effort needed to tailor existing complaint processes does not imply any chilling effect, as the processes are intended to impede censorship, not speech.  Hypothesized flaws in the process do not merit pre-enforcement review, because the platforms cannot show that the lion’s share of the legislation is unconstitutional.

The Fifth Circuit has declined to follow the eleventh Circuit, which recently enjoined a Florida law inhibiting platforms” censorship.  The Florida law only concerned censorship of politicians campaign speech. The Florida law “prohibits all censorship of some speakers, while [the Texas law] prohibits some censorship of all speakers.”  Slip op. at 80.  Moreover, the Florida law implicated the platforms’ own speech by forbidding the platforms from adding addenda to others’ content.   Finally, the fines to be levied under the Florida law are onerous when compared with the non-monetary equitable relief provided to platform users by the Texas law.

The Fifth Circuit does not join the Eleventh Circuit’s view that there is a recognized category of protected speech called “editorial discretion,” The Fifth Circuit further refuses to consider censorship as protected speech and further does not agree that the common carrier doctrine does not support the imposition of nondiscrimination obligations on the platforms.

In a separate concurrence, Judge Edith H. Jones agreed that forbidding censorship is not forbidding speech:

In particular, it is ludicrous to assert, as NetChoice does, that in forbidding the covered platforms from exercising viewpoint-based “censorship,” the platforms’ “own speech” is curtailed. But for their advertising such “censorship”—or for the censored parties’ voicing their suspicions about such actions—no one would know about the goals of their algorithmic magic. It is hard to construe as “speech” what the speaker never says, or when it acts so vaguely as to be incomprehensible. Further, the platforms bestride a nearly unlimited digital world in which they have more than enough opportunity to express their views in many ways other than “censorship.” The Texas statute regulates none of their verbal “speech.” What the statute does, as Judge Oldham carefully explains, is ensure that a multiplicity of voices will contend for audience attention on these platforms. That is a pro-speech, not anti-free speech result. 

Slip op. at 91.

Even if speech were involved, Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 512 U.S.  622 (1994), found that, if speech is involved where cable companies choose channels, under intermediate scrutiny ‘must carry’ preferences are content neutral.  Cable companies did not need to modify their own speech, the mandated speech was not associated with the operators, and the selection of channels could silence competitors.

Additionally, even if the platforms are correct in arguing that Texas’ legislation might chill the platforms” speech, this will not survive a faction attack:

Case by case adjudication is a small burden on the Goliaths of internet communications if they contend with Davids who use their platforms. 

Slip op. at 92.

Judge Leslie H. Southwick separately concurred in part and dissented in part.  Judge Southwick agreed that a facial attack on a state law is unlikely to succeed and that the platforms’ businesses are of great public importance.  He rejected the idea that the court’s conclusions can be recast by an ill-fitting speech/conduct distinction.

The judge observed that what the majority perceives to be censorship he perceives to be editing, and editing in a novel format, having its closest analog in newspaper editorial functions which the Supreme Court has found to be protected First Amendment activity.  Slip op. at 96.

If the First Amendment is involved, this judge agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that the government does not have a substantial interest in preventing unfairness, but the private actors do have an interest in freedom to be unfair.   Slip op. at 108-109.

Moreover, prohibitions on the de-platforming or de-monetizing go too far in attempting to serve any interest the government may have in protecting the free flow of information.  Slip op. at 110.

The judge believes that the common carrier cases do not strip carriers — here, platforms — of a First Amendment right to their own speech. Slip op. at 110-111.  Similarly, Section 230 does not impact platforms’ rights to moderate content. Slip op. at 111. Section 230 exists to underscore that a platform that publishes third party content does not endorse it or adopt it as its own.

Although concurring with the panel’s judgment, Judge Southwick cautioned that when platforms make decisions about permissible speech and its presentation. the platforms are involved in activity which is protect by the First Amendment, which does not require fairness.  Slip op. at 113.

NetChoice, et al. v. Attorney General of Texas, No. 21-51178 (5th Cir.) Opinion issued September 16, 2022

“The Very Objects of the Offense”: DOJ Asks Appellate Court to Stay Trial Court Order Enjoining Investigation Using Materials Seized from Former President’s Residence with Classified Markings


Trump v. United States, No. 22-13005-F (11th Cir.); Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294 (D. Fla.).


The United States seeks immediate appellate intervention in order to stay the order of the U.S. District Court in Florida which appointed a Special Master to review documents and things seized during an August 8, 2022 search of former President Trump’s Mar-a-Lago residence.  The trial court ordered the United States to stop using the documents seized in the government’s ongoing criminal investigation, which includes investigation into whether the former president wrongfully retained national security materials.

The United States submits to the appellate court that the approximately 100 documents bearing ‘Classified’ markings are the very documents the government needs to build its case.   The United States first made this argument to the trial court, which denied relief, but which directed the newly-appointed Special Master to prioritize review of the documents with ‘Classified’ markings.  The court observed that the government had not established any urgency concerning these documents and that the court was not obliged to adopt unquestioningly the position of the United States.

The trial court has outlined a protocol for review of the documents seized which will permit both parties to view the documents, determine which ought to be considered privileged, and submit their recommendations or disagreements to the Special Master.  The Special Master will in turn make recommendations to the trial court, which will, if need be, conduct review de novo.

The former  president as plaintiff is expected to pay for all of the Special Master proceedings, which must be concluded by November 30, 2022.

The newly appointed Special Master, a retired federal judge, has scheduled an initial conference with counsel on September 20th, and has invited submission of agendas not later than September 19th.


Trump v. United States, No. 22-13005-F (11th Cir.) Motion for Partial Stay Pending Appeal, September 16, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) Order of Special Master, September 16, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) Order Appointing Special Master, September 15, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) Order Denying Stay, September 15, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) Declaration of Special Master, September 15, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) United States’ Reply in Support of Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, September 13, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) Parties’ Joint Filing Respecting the Court’s Appointment of a Special Master, September 9, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) Donald J. Trump’s Response in Opposition to Motion for Partial Stay Pending Appeal, September 12, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) Plaintiff’s Proposed Order of Appointment of Special Master, September 9, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) United States’ Proposed Order of Appointment of Special Master, September 9, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-MAC (D. Fla.) United States’ Motion for a Partial Stay Pending Appeal, September 8, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-MAC (D. Fla.) Declaration of Asst. Dir. Counterintelligence, FBI, September 8, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) Notice of Appeal, September 8, 2022

Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294-AMC (D. Fla.) Order, September 5, 2022

A Labor Day of Law: Federal Court Agrees to Appoint Special Master in Challenge to Search at Mar-a-Lago, Enjoins Investigators from Use of Materials Under Review


Donald J. Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294 (MAC).  Order entered September 5, 2022.


Citing the need “to ensure at least the appearance of fairness and integrity,” the federal judge assigned to hear former President Trump’s request for appointment of a Special Master to review materials seized pursuant to an unannounced search of his Florida residence, Mar-a-Lago has granted that request.  

Having concluded that the circumstances warrant the exercise of the court’s equitable jurisdiction and supervisory powers, the court examined the equitable considerations supporting or negating the propriety of the appointment of a Special Master.

The court rejected the government’s argument that the former president could not seek relief because in the government’s view the former president does not own the materials seized.  Not only is this not wholly true, the court observed, but property ownership is no precondition to assertion of Fourth Amendment interests.

The idea that the former president cannot challenge the search fails, in the court’s view, because the issue before the court is not standing on the merits of any claim, but standing to seek equitable relief in the form of a special master, which the court has found to be present.  

The argument that there exists concern only for materials subject to the attorney client privilege but not the executive privilege also fails, the court found, as the government’s assertion that the executive privilege is lost the moment a president vacates the office lacks support in the law.  

The court rejected the notion that the work of a government privilege review team obviates the need for a special master.  While adequate in some cases, the court observed, this is not an ordinary case, and to the extent that there have been instances of some materials not being cabined by the government privilege review team, even if inadvertent, highlights the need for independent review. 

The court has elicited suggestions for appointees to act as Special Master to be filed by the parties by September 9, 2022. 

The government has been ordered not to make use of any of the seized materials under review by the Special Master in any criminal investigation at least during the conduct of the Special Master’s review.  The government may continue its classification and national security review.  

2022 09 05 Trump v US 22-81294 Order

More Translucent than Transparent, Unsealed Government Inventory and Investigative Status Report Indicate Government’s Quest for Evidence Continues


Donald J. Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294 (AMC).  Minute order entered September 2, 2022.

The federal district court in Florida has heard argument concerning the former president’s request for appointment of a Special Master and for other relief, and has directed that the government’s investigative status report and inventory of items seized at the Mar-a-Lago residence be unsealed, with an order to follow.

The federal investigative team has advised the court that it is reviewing materials seized at Mar-a-Lago, has separated them into items with classified markings and those without, has taken care to conform its work to that of a privilege review team.

The federal investigative team has advised the court that the review of the materials seized is in pursuit of an “ongoing criminal investigation.”  The status report explains that materials are being reviewed for relevance to unstated charges:

The investigative team has reviewed the seized materials in furtherance of its ongoing investigation, evaluating the relevance and character of each item seized, and making preliminary determinations about investigative avenues suggested or warranted by the character and nature of the seized items. The seized materials will continue to be used to further the government’s investigation, and the investigative team will continue to use and evaluate the seized materials as it takes further investigative steps, such as through additional witness interviews and grand jury practice. Additionally, all evidence pertaining to the seized items — including, but not limited to, the nature and manner in which they were stored, as well as any evidence with respect to particular documents of interest — will inform the government’s investigation. Thus, it is important to note, “review” of the seized material is not a single investigative step but an ongoing process in this active criminal investigation.

Notice by Investigative Team of Status of Review, page 2.

The status report is clear that the review of seized materials is not in support of conclusions reached with respect to any violations of criminal or civil law, but in support of investigation of whether any violations of criminal or civil law may have occurred.  The review team is clear that such materials may be used in grand jury proceedings.

Should materials become part of grand jury proceedings, disclosure of the nature of any such materials would become highly restricted in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e).

The status report notes that a federal agency is also reviewing the materials seized to determine the threat to national security should such documents be released.

The government investigators have assured the court that due care has been and will be exercised to consider whether any materials are subject to the attorney client privilege.

The newly unsealed inventory provides information about the place from which materials were seized, the number of items in each container, and the nature of the items, such as “magazines” or “newspapers”, clothing, gift items, books, photographs, or items with classification markings.

2022 08 30 Notice by Investigative Team of Status of Review unsealed 2022 09 02

2022 08 30 Detailed Property Inventory Pursuant to Court’s Preliminary Order unsealed 2022 09 02

Counsel for Former President Urge Court to Reject Any Notion that Ownership is a Prerequisite to Challenge to Search and Seizure at Mar-a-Lago Residence


Donald J. Trump v. United States, No. 22-81294 (AMC).  Movant’s Reply to United States’ Response to Motion for Judicial Oversight and Additional Relief, filed August 31, 2022.  Hearing September 1, 2022 at U.S. District Court in Florida at 1 p.m. 

Counsel for former president Donald J. Trump argue that no precedent exists for the government’s argument that in the absence of a property interest –that interest to be determined by the government — an individual seeking to challenge a search and seizure of his residence has no recourse because, in the absence of a property interest — that interest to be determined by the government — the individual who lacks an ownership interest in materials seized lacks standing to seek review.  In the absence of standing, the court has no power to hear the case.  

The government’s argument, counsel have submitted, has no support in extant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which recognizes that it is governmental intrusion that is central to the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions on governmental power.  What is necessary is “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the items seized.” Reply Memorandum at 5, quoting United States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1984).   The government’s position is not only in error as a matter of constitutional law, but the government fails to recognize that the question before the court is the propriety of appointment of a Special Master, which is directed to the power of the court to grant equitable relief. 

Counsel for the former president observe that any authority to conduct privilege review presented within the application for the warrant issued prior to the search and seizure at Mar-a-Lago was narrowly constrained a a certain portion of the property, yet as the government insists that its review is complete, it would appear that the government exceeded those bounds. 

The government’s argument that the court ought not insert itself into what has been styled a ‘national security’ review by a government entity cannot succeed.  Power to adjudicate matters relating to governmental exercise of powers is at the core of the need for a federal judiciary.  

Counsel note that the government has not conducted itself with the high standards which it purports to uphold, as evidence by the dramatic — and apparently staged — submission to the court of a photograph showing documents bearing “classified” cover sheets.

The former president is in need of an inventory of items seized in order to assert his interests in materials gathered through use of criminal process in a matter that ought to have been a routine discussion of items sought for a presidential library under the Presidential Records Act.  

Movant’s Reply to United States, No. 22-81294 August 31, 2022

 

United States Avers Evidence Suggesting Former President Concealed Records Required Warrant Authorizing Search and Seizure of Personal Residence

Donald J. Trump v. United States, No. 22-cv-81294 (AMC).

In response to briefing order issued by the federal district court in Florida, the United States alleged today that it sought to obtain judicial authority to search and seize the former President’s residence because, in doubt concerning the completeness of the custodian of records attestation that records provided to the government were complete, that “[t]he government also developed evidence that government records were likely concealed and removed from the Storage Room and that efforts were likely taken to obstruct the government’s investigation.” United States Response to Motion for Judicial Oversight and for Additional Relief at 10.

The United States argues that the former president has no ownership interest in the records seized, as these belong to the United States under the Presidential Records Act. As the former president is perceived to lack any interest in the records seized, he has no standing to contest the seizure.

Neither does the former president have any interest in return of any personal items seized during the good faith execution of a search warrant, as the United States asserts was the case with the search conducted at the former president’s residence on August 8, 2022.

The United States has advised the court that its review of the records seized has been completed, rendering moot the appointment of a special master, the propriety of which the United States contests.

United States’ Response to Motion for Judicial Oversight and Additional Relief

Attachment to United States’ Response to Motion for Judicial Oversight and Additional Relief

At Your Service: Having Submitted to the Supreme Court an Amicus Brief Arguing Against Post-Presidential Retention of Executive Privilege, Several Counsel Seek Appointment as Special Master in Challenge to Mar-a-Lago Search and Seizure


Donald J. Trump v. United States, No. 22-cv-81294 (CAC).

The judge assigned to former President Donald Trump’s case against the United States concerning search of his Mar-a-Lago residence has indicated that a special master may be appointed to review the documents seized.  

The court has not solicited bids for appointment of a special counsel. 

Today a group called National Security Counselors submitted a letter to the court offering the curriculum vitae of individuals believed to be competent to serve. 

As evidence of experience, the group has filed a copy of an amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court last term in opposition to a petition for certiorari by former President Trump concerning federal records.  There it was argued that no individual claim of presidential executive privilege ought to survive the end of an administration. 

 

Letter to Court Seeking Appointment August 30, 2022

Notice of Proposed Special Master Candidates August 30, 2022

Curriculum Vitae of Proposed Special Masters August 30, 2022

Amicus Brief in Supreme Court 21-932

 

 

Everything is Under (Our) Control, Government Assures Court in Challenge to Search and Seizure at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago Residence

Trump v. United States, No. 22-cv-81294 (AMC). Notice of Receipt of Preliminary Order and Attorney Appearance, filed August 29, 2022.

The United States has advised the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida that the government will provide a detailed, non-public inventory of materials seized at the former president’s residence on August 8, 2022.

The government also indicates that privilege and national security review of the materials seized is underway. The government states that such review was begun before the court issued its August 27th order indicating an intent to appoint a Special Master, intimating that such an appointment will not be necessary.

Notice of Receipt of Preliminary Order August 29, 2022